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Summary findings
Deininger describes a new type of negotiated land reform  Negotiated land reform can succeed only if
that relies on voluntary land transfers negotiated  measures are taken to make the market for land sales and
between buyers and sellers, with the government's role  rental more fluid and transparent.
restricted to establishing the necessary framework for  e  Productive projects are likely to be the key to
negotiation and making a land purchase grant available  market-assisted land reform. The potential for project
to eligible beneficiaries.  productivity establishes an upper bound on the price to
This approach has emerged - following the end of the  be paid and a basis for financial intermediaries to
Cold War and broad macroeconomic adjustment - as  evaluate the project. It also requires beneficiaries to
many countries face a second generation of reforms to  familiarize themselves with the realities they're likely to
address deep-rooted  structural problems and provide a  confront as independent farmers and the limits to how
basis for sustainable economic growth and poverty  much land reform can help them achieve their goals.
reduction.  *  The only way to effectively coordinate the entities
Deininger describes initial experiences in Brazil,  involved in the process is through decentralized,
Colombia, and South Africa. It is too soon to know  demand-driven implementation.
whether negotiated land reform can rise to the challenges  o The long-run success of land reform depends on1
administrative land reform failed to solve but the data so  getting the private sector involved and using the land
far suggest that:  purchase grant to "crowd in" private money.
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The paper describes  background,  initial  experience,  and future challenges  associated  with a
new "negotiated"  approach  to land reform. This approach  has emerged as, following  the
end of the Cold War and broad macro-economic  adjustment,  many countries face a
"second  generation"  of reforms  to address  deep-rooted  structural  problems  and provide  the
basis  for  sustainable poverty reduction and  economic growth. It  reviews possible
theoretical  links --through  credit  market  or political  channels-  between  asset  ownership  and
economic performance.  Program characteristics  in each country, as well as lessons for
implementation,  and implications  for monitoring  and impact  assessment  are discussed.
1  INTRODUCTION
Tlheoretical reasons  and empirical evidence suggest that land reform may provide equity and efficiency
benefits.  A  large  body  of research  has demonstrated the existence  of a robustly negative  relationship
between farm  size and productivity  due to the  supervision cost associated with employing hired  labor.
This implies that redistribution of land from wage-operated large farms to family-operated smaller ones
can increase  productivity  (Binswanger et  al.  1995). In addition,  access to  assets in  general  and  land
ownership in particular is associated with improved access to credit markets and can provide benefits as
an  insurance  substitute  to  smooth  consumption  intertemporally.  By  enabling  the  poor  to  undertake
indivisible  productive  investments (or by preventing  them from  irreversibly depleting their asset-base)
measures to improve the distribution of assets could lead to higher aggregate growth, thus improving both
equity  and efficiency  (see Bardhan et  al.  1997 for references). Aggregate cross-country  regressions  as
2well as more micro-level  evidence  confirm  the poverty-reducing  and growth-enhancing  impact  of a better
distribution  of productive  assets.
This apparent potential  notwithstanding,  actual experience  with land reform  has in many instances  fallen
short of expectations. Despite-or  because-of  this, land reform remains a hotly debated issue in a
number of countries (e.g. Zimbabwe,  Malawi,  South Africa, Guatemala,  El Salvador,  Brazil, Colombia)
some of which are spending  considerable  amounts  of resources  for this purpose.  A mechanism  to provide
an efficiency-  and equity-enhancing  redistribution  of assets that would increase overall investment  at a
cost that is comparable  to other  types of government  interventions  would  be very desirable.
This paper describes  a new type of negotiated  land  reform  that relies on voluntary  land transfers  based on
negotiation between buyers and sellers, where the government's role is restricted to establishing the
necessary  framework  and making available a land purchase  grant to eligible beneficiaries.  Section two
discusses  the land reform experience  in general,  thus providing  the historical  background  and conceptual
basis for the subsequent  argument.  Section  three is devoted  to a more detailed description  of negotiated
land reform in Colombia,  covering  the reasons for choosing  a negotiated  approach,  its principles,  and its
implementation  in a number  of pilot municipios.  Section four compares  the mechanisms  utilized  to those
adopted in Brazil and South  Africa and briefly highlights  some of the implications  for monitoring  the new
approach.  Section  five concludes.
2  LAND  REFORM: POTENTIAL AND  HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
While land reform has long been the subject of policy debate, the motivation  for addressing  land issues
has shifted  considerably  over time. Initial discussions  were largely motivated  by political considerations,
supported by the notion of the inverse farm-size productivity  relationship. This notion had received
empirical support from cross-sectional  studies across states (Kutcher and Scandizzo, 1979), countries
(Berry and Cline 1979), or individual farms (Barraclough, 1970).  1 More recent contributions have
emphasized  the importance of asset ownership in situations characterized  by incomplete contracting
(Bardhan  et al. 1998),  elaborating  on models  such as Dasgupta and Ray 1986  and 1987  and Moene 1992.
The underlying  idea is that, in situations  characterized  by credit rationing, individuals  may not be able to
undertake indivisible  investments  in human capital (schooling)  or productive assets (wells, bullocks, or
perennials with a long gestation period) that need to be financed through credit. This idea has been
'One  of the first studies to provide both a theoretical model and an empirical  investigation of the potential impact of land reform indicates that,
based on district level data from India, land reform can indeed have a positive impact on wages and employment (Rosenzweig 1978).
3formalized  in a  number  of theoretical  models  where  lack of collateral  keeps  individuals  in "poverty
traps", unable to undertake highly profitable indivisible investments (Galor and Zeira 1993,Eckstein and
Zilcha, 1994).2
In such a setting, the poor would fail to get out of poverty not because they are inherently less productive
or lack the necessary skills, but because informational imperfections preclude them from access to credit
markets and because,  as a consequence, they never get the opportunity to utilize or fully develop their
abilities. If this is true, a one-off redistribution to low wealth groups could strictly dominate other policy
instruments (Hoff and Lyon,  1994). In particular it will, in the medium to longer term, be more effective
and less costly than continuing redistribution of income (e.g. through social programs) which would be
associated with strong disincentive effects (Banerjee and Newman 1993; Mookherjee 1997).
Support for the  importance  of asset (and income)  distribution  for economic  outcomes is provided by
cross-country regressions which indicate the presence of a significant negative impact of the initial  asset
distribution on subsequent economic growth (Birdsall and Londono 1997). This growth-reducing impact
is particularly severe for the poor (Deininger and Squire 1998). Indeed, overall inequality seems to have
an important impact on societies'  ability to effectively and quickly respond to exogenous shocks (Rodrik
1998), the level of crime (Fajnzylber et al. 1998), and the degree to which special interest groups are able
to appropriate rents -with  implications for overall productive efficiency (Banerjee et al. 1997).
Although inequality may significantly affect economic performance, historical examples for major changes
of inequality within a country are rare (Li et al. 1998). More specifically, the success of land reform was
critically dependent on the form of production into which  it was introduced. In  landlord estates where
tenants already cultivated the land and all that was required was a reassignment of property rights, land
reform  was  relatively  straightforward  and  associated  with  significant productivity  increases  and  the
emergence of stable systems of production? The main reason is that the organization of production remained
the same family farm system, and that beneficiaries already had the skills and implements necessary to
cultivate their fields. Organizational requirements of conducting such land reforms were minimal -making
them comparable to the "stroke of a pen" reforms familiar from the literature on macro-economic reform.
Indeed, since the end of World War II, landlord estates in Bolivia, large  areas of China, Eastern India,
2 Though  still  accumulating,  empirical  evidence does support some of these conclusions  (Jalan and Ravallion,  1997, Fafchamps  and Pender
1997).
While it would be desirable to have more studies examining the productivity impact of such reforms in quantitative terms, there is agreement in the
literature that such reforms have been associated with significant increases in output and/or productivity  Callison 1983; Koo 1968; King 1977,
Lieten 1996, Besley and Burgess 1998,Domer and Thiesenhusen 1990, Otsuka 1991).
4Ethiopia,  Iran, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan  have  been transferred  to tenants in the course of successful  land
reforms. 4
By contrast, land reform in haciendas,  i.e. systems  where tenants had a small house-plot  for subsistence
but worked the majority  of the time on the landlord's home  farm, has been very difficult,  up to the point
where the "game of Latin American Land Reform" was declared  to be lost (de Janvry and Sadoulet,
1989).  In the large majority  of cases large landowners  responded  to the threat of land reform with large-
scale evictions long before governments were able to  effectively implement laws aimed at tenant
protection  or land  reform .They either resumed  extensive  livestock  production  and ranching  or -aided by
significant credit subsidies- started highly mechanized self-cultivation  (Binswanger  et al. 1995). This
reduced tenant welfare, depopulated  farms, and created  further  difficulties  for redistributive  land reform.
The experience  with land reform  in these environments  points  towards  three specific  difficulties:
First, the transfer  from large  to small  farmers  requires  a change  in the pattern of production,  construction  of
complementary  infrastructure,  subdivision  of the farm, and settlement  of additional  beneficiaries  over and
above  the workers  who have  already  been living  on the farm. 5 Farms  acquired  for purposes  of land reform
have generally  not been farmed  at full capacity,  were run down or decapitalized,  or highly  mechanized.  In
all of these  cases failure  to bring in additional  beneficiaries,  to provide  resources  for simple  works  (cleaning
of pastures, fencing,  construction  of basic infrastructure,  etc.) during the startup  phase, and to ensure the
availability  of productive  assets and technical  assistance  to go with the land have often contributed  to the
failure  of reform  efforts. 6
Second, land reform beneficiaries,  even if they are workers  of the former farm,  are rarely accustomed  to
making  independent  entrepreneurial  decisions,  a constraint  that is particularly  important  if (as in many of the
cases described above) realization of  the  potential benefits from  land reform requires significant
modifications  in the farm's cropping  pattern.  Programs  that are limited  to the mere transfer  of land,  without
training and technical assistance,  have made it difficult  for beneficiaries  to quickly  reach an equilibrium
characterized  by high levels  of productivity  and savings  and, to the degree  that beneficiaries  were not able  to
get  access  to these,  may  have  resulted  in a permanent  decrease  in agricultural  productivity.
Conceptually, one would expect productivity gains to be proportional to the improvement in work and investment incentives associated with the
post-reform  regime.  In cases  where  security  of tenure  had  already  been  high  before  the  reform,  where  cash-rent  (rather  than share  rent)  contracts
had prevailed,  and where landlords  had provided  tenants with access  to markets  for credit,  inputs, and outputs,  one would expect static
efficiency  gains  from  land reforms  to be modest  and the bulk of reform  benefits  to come  through  enhanced  investment  incentives  (and  credit
access  on better  terns) associated  with land  ownership.
In many cases where  large farms  were distributed  exclusively  to the resident  labor force (e.g. in Peru,  Nicaragua,  Honduras,  and Cuba), ile
resulting  units were too large  to be able to reap the benefits  from utilization  of family  labor.  As a result,production  on the reformned  farms was
often characterized  by pervasive  labor problems  and failure  of productivity  increases  to materialize.
'The only  exception  is where  alreadywell-established  plantations  were redistributed  to the former  workers,  a case  that is  very  costly  and characterized
by relatively  low  social  benefits  (Adriano  et al. 1990).
5Third,  in rural environments  with multiple  market  imperfections,  providing  beneficiaries  with access  to land
but not with access  to markets  for output  and credit  may fail to make them better off than before.  This will
be the case particularly  if landlords  had provided  their labor  tenants with inputs, credit, or market outlets
before  the reform. 7 Land markets  will therefore  have to be viewed  in the context  of the operation  of other
factor markets.
These generic land reform difficulties  were, in past attempts  to effect the redistribution  of land to the
poor, often exacerbated  by implementation-related  issues.  Instead of aiming toincrease  productivity  and
reduce poverty,  the main goal of many land reforms in the past has been to calm social unrest and allay
political pressures by peasant organizations. 8 Such reforms had often been initiated in response to
political pressure (or to divert attention from other problems)  rather than as part of a long-term rural
development strategy. 9 The resulting reform measures were generally designed ad hoc, bore little
relation to actual needs on the ground, and commitment  to them faltered once social emergencies  had
subsided.  Furthermore,  attention  often focused  on the politically  vocal and well-connected  peasants  rather
than rural dwellers with the best ability to make productive  use of the land, or the most deserving  on
poverty  grounds.  10
The cost of carrying out land reform were often increased by the continued existence of implicit and
explicit  distortions  which drove land prices  above  the capitalized  value of agricultural  profits and made it
attractive  for land reform  beneficiaries  to sell out to large farmers,  thus contributing  to re-concentration  of
holdings. 1 I Also, instead  of aiming  to create conditions  that would improve  the functioning  of land rental
and sales markets to complement  state-led  reform efforts, governments  have often completely outlawed
or severely restricted the operation of land rental (and to a  lesser degree sales) markets. This has
eliminated an important opportunity for landless individuals  to acquire farming experience,  made the
In Ireland, in the early 20a century, a large scaie "negotiated"  land reform transferred of 9.3 million acres (about half of the agricultural land
available) from landowners to tenants but had a very limited impact on productivity.  One reason is that land reform -which  was enacted
on top  of earlier legislation- did little to alter the structure of production or increase investment incentives. Another issue, probably more
important,  is that land reform led to a worsening of access to credit, by limiting the ability of new landowners to mortgage land while at
the same time cutting  off informal credit they had earlier obtained from the landlord(Guinnaune and Miller, 1997).  Severely restricted
access to credit, together with  insecure property rights have also led to widespread selling of land by former land reform beneficiaries  in
Nicaragua - often at prices way below the productive value of the land (Joakin 1996)Lack of access other markets has been identified as a
key obstacle to the initiation and success of independent small farming operations in Easterm  Europ(Brooks  and Lerman 1996).
This would be consistent with an interpretation of land reform as a piecemeal strategy by the rich to avoid the imminent threat of revolt - with
backtracking as soon as the threat weakens as modeled byHorowitz (1993).
Even where a genuine commitment to breaking the power of landed dlites, agrarian reforms were generally designed by urban intellectuals with
little idea of the realities of agricultural production and a sound suspicion  against the ability of small-scale cultivators to manage on their
own. let alone to be able to increase productivity (Barraclough 1970).
'° The importance of political factors is also evident from a number of Eastern European countries where political constraints generally led to a
relatively "inefficienf'  way of implementing land reform -through physical restitution of plots rather than compensation of former owners
through fungible cash payments (Swinnen, 1997).
"  Despite attempts to limit beneficiary desertion through imposition of legal restrictions and severe punishment in case of contravention, there is
considerable anecdotal evidence on land sales by reform beneficiaries in Nicaragua, Colombia, and El Salvador. In a recent Census of Brazilian
land reform settlements, only about 60% of land reform beneficiaries were actually found tilling their land.
6progress  of land reform totally dependent  on bureaucratic  efforts, and complicated  the task of targeting
assistance to  the poor.  This complete reliance on government spawned complex regulations and
cumbersome  bureaucratic  requirements to  implement  land  reform  which  stretched  available
administrative  capacity (Lipton 1974) and resulted in highly centralized  processes of implementation.
Government  bureaucracies  at the central level -justified by the need to provide  technical assistance and
other support services  to beneficiaries-  proved expensive  and, unable  to utilize information  from the local
level, often  also quite ineffective.
3  NEGOTIATED  LAND  REFORM  IN COLOMBIA
3.1  BACKGROUND
3.1.1  Land reform  before 1994
In  Colombia, land reform has  been a  long-standing concern to  correct an  extremely inequitable
distribution of  land, to  increase the  productivity and environmental sustainability of  agricultural
production,  and to reduce widespread  rural violence.  Maldistribution  of land in rural areas,  while dating
back to the encomiendas  given out following  the Spanish  conquest,  has been reinforced  and exacerbated
in more recent times by a number  of policy  related  factors.  12 These  include:
(i)  Tax incentives  for agriculture  that implied  that rich individuals  acquired land in order to offset taxes
on non-agricultural  enterprises.
(ii) Legal impediments  to the smooth  functioning  of the land rental and sales markets.  Share tenancy was
either directly outlawed  or, when this was lifted, discouraged  by the fact that tenants would receive
property  rights to whatever land improvements  they had made, making it in principle impossible  to
terminate their leases.
(iii)  Credit and interest rate subsidies  plus disproportionate  protection  of the livestock  subsector  provided
incentives  for agricultural  cultivation  with very low labor  intensity  (World  Bank, 1996).
(iv) The use of land to launder  money  that had been acquired  by drug lords.
12 It is well known that market imperfections that are commonly encountered in rural areas of developing countries can lead to concentration of
land  in  the  hands  of  larger  producers  (e.g.  Carter  and Mesbah  1993). However  credit  market  imperfections  alone  -without  policy
interventions- can not explain the heavyunderutilization of land in Colombia where 75% of potential cropland are currently under pasture
- it would presumably  be more profitable for  large landowners to  rent out tosharetenants  rather than to  use land for  extensive  cattle
ranching or to leave it completely fallow.
7These factors have  profound implications for factor use, employment  generation, and welfare  in rural
areas. First,  while  small  farmers  were  often driven off  their traditional  lands to  eke out  a  living  in
marginal and environmentally  fragile areas, much of the best  agricultural land (75 percent of the  land
suitable for  crop  production)  was devoted to  extensive livestock  grazing  or not farmed  at  all  due to
violence (Heath and Binswanger  1996). This suggests that there are indeed large tracts of unutilized  or
underutilized land which could be subjected to land reform in order to increase agricultural productivity -
a notion in line with available empirical evidence. 13
Second, rather than making use of labor, economic growth has been labor-saving. Since the  1950s, the
rate of growth of rural employment has been significantly lower than aggregate economic growth, which
is surprising even by the standard of other Latin American countries (Mision Social 1990). This appears
to have increased peasants'  inclination to support, or at least live with exceptionally high levels of rural
violence that increasingly constitute a drag on the whole economy (estimates in the Colombian press put
the losses associated with rural violence at about 15 percent of GDP). The government sees the reduction
of rural violence as an important goal of land reform.
Third, structural  adjustment made  the lack of adaptability in the large  farm sector particularly  blatant.
Elimination  of credit  subsidies caught large  mechanized farms that  cultivated mainly traditional  crops
with minimal labor inputs in a debt-trap that made them unable to adjust to the new environment and take
advantage  of the opportunities for exports of nontraditional  and more labor-intensive  crops. Unable to
respond to the loss of agricultural protection in a productive way, the large farm sector resorted to large-
scale lobbying. Establishment  of a dynamic small farm sector would, it was hoped, enable Colombia to
capitalize  on  its  agro-ecological  diversity  and  significantly  increase  its  exports  of  traditional  and
nontraditional crops.
None  of these  concerns  are  new.  The maldistribution  of productive  resources,  especially  land,  was
identified as one of the root causes of economic stagnation by a World Bank mission in the  1950s. In
1961, the government established the National Land Reform Institute (InstitutoNacional  Colombiano de
Reforma  Agraria  or  INCORA),  to  bring  about  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  assets  in  the  rural
economy.  However,  even  though  considerable  amounts  of  resources  were  spent  on  land  reform
(INCORA's  average annual budget  in the late 1980s was about US$140 million), most was spent on a
'3  Balcazar  (1990)  summarizes  the existing  literature  in three  points,  namely  (i) small farms  farm  more intensively  than large  farms,  as measured
by value of output  per unit area;  (ii) between  1973-76  and 1988  average  physical  yields on small farms  have increased  by about  82% (this
seems  to be an unweighted  average  across  different  types of crops)  whereas  those on large farms  have remained  stagnant;  (iii) regional  as
well as commodity-specific  studies do not find any systematic  relationship  between farm size and adoption of new technology  or
improvements  in productivity.
8large bureaucracy 14 and almost 35 years of operations  had produced  little visible effect on the ground.
INCORA appeared to be more effective in regularizing  spontaneous  settlement on the frontier than in
converting  the landless into successful  agricultural  entrepreneurs  in areas that were previously  cultivated
by large owners.  Even where land  reform  did distribute  land,  lack of capital forced  many beneficiaries  to
abandon full-time agriculture and rent out part or all of their land, often to the old landlord. In the
aggregate,  between the 1960s  and 1990,  the Gini coefficient  of the operational  land distribution fell by
only 3 percentage  points, from 0.87  to 0.84.
3.1.2  The new Law and its implementation
Not unrelated  to the loss of INCORA's traditional source of finance -a share of duties on agricultural
imports that was eliminated  with agricultural  trade liberalization-  a law was passed in 1994  that would
allow for a more decentralized  and demand-driven  process. However, despite favorable preconditions,
and the government's expressed determination  to distribute one million hectares within four years, the
land reform program had a  disappointingly  slow start.1 5 Before describing the new implementation
arrangements  that emerged to improve on this, it is worthwhile  to consider the main reasons for this
lackluster  performance  and the measures  taken to address  this issue.
To overcome  the "fundamental  financing  problem  of the poor" (Binswanger  and Elgin 1988,  Carter and
Mesbah 1993), i.e. the fact that fully mortgage-based  financing of  land purchases by the poor is
infeasible,  the Colombian  Land Reform  Law provides  for a land purchase  grant. The grants amounts  to
70% of the negotiated land purchase  price, up to a maximum  that was based on historical land reform
allocations. 16 However, the grant was restricted to the purchases of land and could not be used to
undertake  complementary  investments.  This created incentives  for collusion  between sellers and buyers
to overstate land prices, divide the surplus  between them, and let the government  foot the bill.1 7 The
resulting incentive structure was strongly biased in favor of the transfer of developed  agricultural land
4 In the early 1990s the administrative costs of transferring land were very high, amounting to about 50 percent of the total land reform budget or
about $15,000 per beneficiary.
5 This failre to proceed more swiftly with implementation of the negotiated model of land reform was not due to resource constraints but rather
institutional  rigidities  and resistance. In fact, resources available for market  assisted land reform were accumulated until the end of the
year and then disbursed in a rushed  process that bore little relationship to the regulations of the law, using  the argument that it would be
better to spend the resources imperfectly than losing them.
16 For historical reasons, the grant was set to be 70% of the purchase price of the land. The remaining 30 percent of the land purchase price, plus
any additional  start-up investment,  has to be obtained from other sources - either the farm household's  own resources  or a regular loan from a
financial institution at market rates, i.e. without any specific subsidy for land reform beneficiaries. It was hoped that by sharing the risk, financial
intermediaries would provide additional assurance of the economic viability of land reform enterprises. While the high level of subsidy received
strong political  support from large landowners, experience thus far indicates that beneficiaries would be better  served by a more modest grant
that can be used for either land purchase or investments related to the startup of the new enterprise, i.e. that the 70%  is too high.
17 Landlords have  in many  instances overstated the price of land, and-by  covering the complete land value with  the 70 percent grant-have
obtained a subsidy element of 100 percent. Consequently,  in 1996 the price of land acquired through  "direct intervention" by INCORA
9close to infrastructure  and already well endowed with the necessary complementary  investment.  This
tended to reduce land reform to a mere redistribution  of existing assets rather than the creation of new
ones, by targeting underutilized  lands and helping  beneficiaries  to undertake significant  investments.  To
deal with these issues, it was clarified  that the goal of market  assisted land  reform is the establishment  of
viable productive projects (proyectos  productivos),  rather than the mere transfer of land. A mechanism
was devised to facilitate use of grant funds to finance  non land investments,  thus overcoming  the bias
inherent in previous  legal provisions."
A second issue was that, to create viable agricultural  enterprises,  rather  than a "rural proletariat",  a target
income from full time agriculture  (equivalent  to a minimum  farm size of about 15 hectares) was legally
required. This neglected the potential of the poor-especially  those in proximity to urban areas-to
derive income from a  variety of  sources and left  little room either for the exit  of unsuccessful
beneficiaries  or the gradual expansion  of the holdings of successful  ones through rental or purchase of
additional  land. It also demonstrated  little awareness  of the requirements,  in terms of human  capital,  other
assets, and experience  with financial and marketing institutions,  associated  with operating a 15 hectare
farm.19 As a result, the law was in danger of concentrating  large amounts of subsidies on a well-
connected  "agrarian bourgeoisie"  while leaving the majority  of potential  beneficiaries  uncovered.20 To
overcome this shortcoming,  the target income  was reduced  by one third and, rather than being based on
general averages, is to be assessed based on a project-specific  plan elaborated by beneficiaries that
included  income  from non-agricultural  sources.
Finally, even  though the law provides  for an exemplary  and elaborate  institutional  structure 21 to facilitate
an encompassing  process of reform, the fact that there was little incentive for local leaders to actually
establish the necessary structures  implied  that it was difficult  to make the model operational  and ensure
(under a residual budget) was lower than the price of land acquired by beneficiaries through "negotiated" land reform in the open market,
leading to widespread dissatisfaction and calls for the return to the interventionist paradigm.
I  Given that this regulation  creates  another layer of bureaucracy,  transaction  costs, and uncertainty  about approval  (or  scope  for politically
motivated interventions), it would have been more desirable to change the underlying legal framework than develop ad-hoc solutions.
'9 The concentration of benefits  may be expedient from a political point of view - especially if thebenefts can be appropriated by the about  10-
15% of the peasantry that is politically well organized and that closely collaborates with INCORA. However,  comparison with European
standards can put the farm size issue in perspective. In 1990 (the latest year for which these statistics are available), average farm size in
the EU (including former East Germany) was, with  14.8 hectares, slightly below the Colombian "minimum  size" of 15 hectares. Average
farm sizes in Greece and Italy are only 4 and 5.6 hectares, respectively, and even in the Netherlands  and Germany, the average size of
well-established farms was only 16 hectares (Eurostat  1995).
20 The categorical  prohibition  of rental  of land  reform  land (included  in  the  1994 law)  is  unlikely  to  be  enforceable,  and  may  even  be
counterproductive  in that it would discourage successful reform beneficiaries from intensification on part of their land and renting out the
other part while preventing unsuccessful reform beneficiaries from exiting.
21  The institutional  structure  is  exemplary  from a conceptual point  of view, comprising  (i) decentralized  decision-making  characterized  by
maximum local participation  expressed through the pre-eminent  role of the  local councils;  (ii) private  sector  involvement  in bringing
together potential buyers,  provision of complementary credit, and technical assistance to continue during the first two years of production
on  the  land received;  and the  (iii)  limitation  of  INCORA to  a regulatory  role preventing  misuse  of funds,  ensuring  that  regulatory
requirements are met, and coordinating the different government agencies involved.
10effective beneficiary participation. Lack of dissemination of the law prevented a truly democratic process
at  the  local  level.  Continued  subsidization  of  INCORA  drove  out  private  service  providers22 and
"success"  continued  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  transferring  land  and  exhausting  budgets  than  in
establishing  viable  rural  enterprises.  To  change  this,  a  shift  of  responsibility  for  approval  from
INCORA's  headquarters to regional offices had to be accompanied by transferring resources directly to
local communities and by clarifying that, among others, existence and functioning of a municipal council
was a precondition for municipios to become eligible for land reform funds.
3.2  IMPLEMENTATION
While the  first two years  of program implementation highlighted critical  shortcomings, they  provided
little insight in how to actually implement such a program. In this section we use the experience from five
pilot municipios, selected to reflect the heterogeneity of the country,23 to illustrate four key elements for
implementation namely
(i)  making  land  reform  a  program  "owned"  by  the  local  government,  thus  achieving  better
integration  of land reform with existing municipal development priorities or investments and at
the same time greatly reducing transaction costs;
(ii)  requiring the elaboration of productive projects that provide the basis  for a more programmatic
approach to beneficiary training, negotiation of land prices, and an economic  evaluation of the
expected benefits and costs of land reform;
(iii)  establishing  a decentralized and "hands on" program of beneficiary training that would act as a
means  of pre-selecting  beneficiaries (based  on  their  willingness to  participate),  help  them  to
overcome  their  structural  difficulties,  ensure  greater  "ownership"  and  ultimately  economic
sustainability of projects;
(iv)  insisting  on  a  transparent  and  public  process  of  project  approval  and  linking  the  needed
mechanisms of accountability directly to a process of monitoring and evaluation that links to the
municipal  land reform plan, aims to quickly detect deviations from targets and the reasons for
22 Private real estate  agents, who were supposed to act as information brokers in making potential  buyers and sellers aware of market  demands,
found it difficult to  compete with  comparable INCORA services which were offered free of charge.  In addition,  INCORA's  continued
involvement  in  the  decision-making  process-including  its ability to  manipulate  political  levers-put  the  institution  in  a position  to
virtually guarantee a "successful" outcome.
23  These municipios  are San Benito  Abad  in Sucre, Riveria in Huila, Fuente de Oro in Meta, Montelibano  in Cordoba, and Puertowilches  in
Santander.  While  continued  guerrilla  activity  throughout  Colombia  undoubtedlyafffects  the  scope  for  implementing  land  reform,
acceptance of and support for the process at the local level has virtually eliminated guerrilla-related disruptions.
11them, and forms the basis for an in-depth  impact  assessment  of the land reform  process at a later
stage.
The expectation  is that the steps taken by local governments  to improve  infrastructure  and functioning  of
other factor markets, together with the land-reform  specific measures  (described  in detail below), would
improve potential beneficiaries' capacity  to negotiate  and make productive use of land and at the same
time reduce the gap between  the net present  value of agricultural  profits land prices.  This, in turn, would
reduce the size of the land purchase grant required per person, thus making it possible to use a given
amount  of grant  money  to attend to a larger  number  of beneficiaries.
3.2.1  The Municipal Land Reform Plan
A key document in the pilot municipios  has been a municipal  land reform plan. This plan, elaborated  in a
decentralized  fashion, contains information  about demand and supply of land for land reform purposes,
and a characterization  of the institutional  environment  and responsibilities  for land reform. Following a
systematic  procedure  to establish  a municipal  plan is expected  to have three main benefits.
The first is to identify  potential demand  for this type of land reform.  This includes steps such as raising
awareness among the beneficiary  population and-  help target the most needy, to establish a transparent
process that can ground land reform firmly within the context of other local development  initiatives,  to
identify the potential demand for land reform,  and to develop realistic expectations  about the extent to
which land reform  can contribute  to the solution  of existing  problems.
A second benefit is to identify  potential  supply and to generate  the basis for reasonably  competitive  land
markets by ensuring that supply of land (at reasonable prices and in areas suitable for small farmer
cultivation)  exceeds demand.
A final issue is the establishment  -at  the local level- of the institutional infrastructure  needed for
effective implementation  of land reform.  To ensure sustainability  of land  reform  projects, it has proven to
be critical to  identify NGOs who are able to provide continuing technical assistance, and financial
institutions  who are in a position  to extend and effectively  supervise credit to land reform beneficiaries.
These elements, together with information on the contributions expected from different participants
(beneficiaries, central government, local institutions), makes it much easier for local authorities to
elaborate  a coordinated  program  of land reform that is in line with the specific  needs and opportunities,
including  the fiscal capacity,  of the municipio.
12Identification  of potential  beneficiaries
Under the process followed  before initiation  of the pilots, selection  of beneficiaries  was often arbitrary
and ad hoc. Despite the regulations  of the new law, INCORA  continued  to select beneficiaries  on a case
by case basis once a given farm had been put up for sale and central approval for the release of the
necessary land purchase funds had been obtained. In these cases, to be able to disburse funds quickly,
sales of farms were often quite secretive,  despite  the existence  (on paper) of a needs-based  qualification
system. The selection  committees  that were established  included  workers of the existing farm who were
generally  careful not to admit  too many contenders  from outside. 24
To ensure participation beyond the membership of well-established  campesino  organizations and a
transparent and more competitive market for land, this approach has, in the pilot municipios, been
replaced  by a procedure that aims to create the basis for land transactions  through a more competitive
market. To identify potential demand, a systematic  information  campaign to disseminate  the law, with
subsequent  inscription  of potential  land reforn beneficiaries  (aspirantes)  in a registry  to be maintained  by
INCORA, is conducted throughout the  municipio.  A  questionnaire provides basic information on
beneficiaries' educational level, their agricultural  experience (if any), their income sources, and their
access to  other types of government services such as  education or health. Based on  this, a  pre-
qualification,  essentially  a means  test based  on assets, is conducted.
Experience indicates  that enabling potential  beneficiaries  to register at public offices and police stations
in outlying villages has considerably  broadened  the outreach  of the program.  Contrary  to the procedures
followed earlier by INCORA, the information supplied is checked for consistency, resulting in the
elimination of a  large number of non-qualified applications. The names of rejected and accepted
aspirantes  (with reasons  for rejection)  are posted publicly.  The publicity  of the selection  process seems  to
have increased  accountability,  and facilitated  a better understanding  of the scope and limitations of land
reform  by local authorities  and potential  beneficiaries.  In all of the pilotmunicipios,  alternative  programs
have been initiated  to (temporarily  or permanently)  take care of the specific  needs of groups  who will not
be able to benefit from land reform in the immediate  future. These  programs include chicken hatcheries
and other micro-enterprises  for female household  heads, construction  of rural roads under seasonal  food
for work schemes,  as well as reforestation  of environmentally  fragile zones.
24 While  one would expect  that the transfer  of large  and relatively  extensively  cultivated  farms  would provide  an opportunity  for accommodating
additional  workers,  the opposite often happened  in practice,  due to the unwillingness  of existing workers  to reduce their share and the
associated  incentives  to exaggerate  the amnount  of land needed to establish  a productive  unit. This tendency to expel laborers is well
known from  the theory of cooperatives.
13In addition  to generating  awareness  for the program,  its potential  target group, aand  the characteristics  of
demand, the process of beneficiary  selection  also provides  a basis for local authorities  to integrate land
reform into a broader program of capacity building and social assistance at the municipal level. This
could contribute  to the resolution of at least some aspects of the potential conflict between the dual
objectives  of equity and efficiency  which is to some extent unavoidable  if land reform is to make a long-
term sustainable  contribution  to poverty  reduction.
Creating  the basis for a functioning  land market
The availability  of large amounts  of unutilized  or underutilized  land in large holdings implies that, in a
reasonably  fluid land market there would be plenty of supply to enable potential beneficiaries  to choose
the most suitable lands and negotiate  to obtain a competitive  price. In practice, however, land markets
have found to be thin, highly segmented,  characterized  by high transaction  costs, and often pushed into
inforrnality  (FAO, 1994). Credit market imperfections,  lack of market information  by potential sellers,
and the lack of farmn  models suited to the specific needs and factor endowments  of small agricultural
producers,  have prevented such an outcome and contributed  to the fact that beneficiaries  under the old-
style reform program often acquired marginal lands at highly exaggerated prices without making
productive  use of it.25
In the pilot municipios,  a procedure  similar  to the identification  of demand  for land is being followed on
the supply side as well. The first step is to determine  ecologically  suitable  zones and, based on cadastral
information,  establish an inventory of the land according to- size classification  that could be used to
identify  target areas for agrarian  reform.  Areas  where land  reform  would result in environmental  hazards,
where soil fertility is insufficient,  or where the existing  ownership structure  is already characterized  by
small to medium-sized  holdings, are thus eliminated  a priori. This gives beneficiaries  a better idea of
where to focus their efforts,  helps to set realistic  goals, and puts into perspective  the potential  contribution
of land reform  for solving  the social problems  of a given  municipio.  It increases  not only awareness  of the
scope for land reform as compared  to other options aiming at overall development  of the municipio  (and
the degree to which the success  of land reform will depend  on such complementary  measures),  but also
forces local governments to think about potential levers (from land taxes to land price information
systems and training  to increase  the productive  capacity  of potential  beneficiaries)  that they can utilize to
25 As highlighted  earlier, even  under  the new  land reform  law,  rationing  was largely  by non-price  means-including outright  corruption-and the
main challenge for landowners  willing to sell was to obtain clearance  from the regional and central INCORA  offices regarding the
availability  of funds to purchase  their land which  was seen  as the precondition  for proceeding  with negotiations.
14achieve an process of "integrated land market development". 26 Experience  from the pilots indicates  that
land that had traditionally  been offered  to INCORA  for land reform was often of marginal quality and
hardly suitable for land reform while  some of the best land continued  to lie idle or underutilized.  Specific
measures  to resolve  this issue  have included:
*  Increasing  sellers' awareness  of the scope and potential  for alternative  forms, such.  as land rental that
could temporarily or permanently provide potential beneficiaries with access to  land increases
efficiency  and may serve as a springboard  for the landless  to acquire  the information  and agricultural
experience  necessary  to put together  a productive  project.
*  Encouraging  more effective collection of existing  municipal land taxes - a strategy in line with the
central government's desire to increase the revenue base of local governments  and to gradually
reduce the need for central  transfers.
*  More effective  and systematic  dissemination  of information  not only among  potential  buyers but also
any sellers of land, specifically  information  on the mechanisms  of market-assisted  land reform and
the modalities  of payment under  this program.
There is justified concern  that a program  that provides  targeted support  to land purchases  may contribute
to an increase in land prices, and therefore  benefit former  landowners  rather than the poor farmers who
receive the land. To deal with this, it has been decided that, to be eligible for land reform benefits,
municipios need to provide evidence  (using actual sale inscriptions/offers  by landowners)  that existing
land supply  is at least three times the amount  of land  to be transacted  under the land reform  program.
Institutional  basis
Experience  suggests  that, in the absence  of technical support  during  the startup  phase and without  access
to markets for finance and outputs, the sustainability  of newly initiated land reform settlements  will be
limited.  The municipal  plan thus contains  a list of qualified  providers of technical assistance  from which
potential beneficiaries  can choose one to use the part of the land purchase grant that is earmarked for
technical assistance. In addition, it aims to identify financial institutions  that would be willing to lend to
land reform  beneficiaries.  The rationale  for this is simple:  It is likely  to be futile to initiate a large process
of land reform in a municipio where neither credit nor product markets are accessible to potential
beneficiaries  or where capacity to provide technical assistance is grossly inadequate.  While identifying
financial intermediaries  who would in principle be willing to lend to land reform beneficiaries  does not
26  In principle the decentralized implementation mechanism, if coupled with  competitive allocation of funds across municipos, should  eliminate
the scope for spending scarce resources on municipios where land reform is not economically feasible and outmigration  is the most cost-
15imply that every application will automatically be approved, it can help both parties to be more clear
about the rules of the game from the beginning  and, in addition, significantly  reduce the search cost to be
incurred  by individual  beneficiaries.
3.2.2  Formulation  of productive  projects
To help beneficiaries assess the requirements, opportunities, and risks they will face as independent
farmers more realistically, elaboration of model farm projects has proved to be critical. While these
models are necessarily abstract and therefore not directly applicable to the circumstances of specific
beneficiaries or farms, they enable beneficiaries and technical assistance providers to be more specific
about key factors such as marketing channels, input supplies,  working capital requirements, etc. that need
to be made more concrete during the subsequent  process.
Under  the  approach followed by  INCORA, where  agricultural productivity received little  if  any
consideration, beneficiaries generally elaborated their "productive projects" after getting access to the
land, with little systematic guidance and no discretion in the use of the technical assistance funds which
were administered by INCORA (often with "beneficiaries" receiving no benefits at all). Without a clear
understanding of the economic potential of the farms to be established, expected returns, and alternative
options (within or outside the land reform program), beneficiaries' ability to  engage in  substantive
bargaining was greatly diminished.  It was only natural that INCORA took the lead in "negotiating" with
the  landlord; 27  a type of negotiation which ordinarily amounted to a mere formality and generally
resulted in acceptance of the price set by an "independent"  valuer who was contracted  by the landlord  and
paid in proportion to the assessed farm value.
The pilot experience has indicated that, unless beneficiaries have a clear idea of productive opportunities
consistent with their abilities  before they formulate  productive projects that form the basis for "shopping"
for  land, it is very difficult to break this  deadlock. To this  end, agricultural professionals that  are
contracted through beneficiary  representatives  help establish  crop budgets for a range of options actually
practiced in the municipio  and conduct training courses and meetings to disseminate them. Aggregation
of these  into farm plans involving more intensive land use and sustainable income to beneficiaries
provides the basis for the formulation of "productive projects" by individual beneficiaries. Only after
effective form of satisfying demands for land. Due to the Imiited  extent of the pilot, no such cases have, as of yet, been encountered.
R7 This perception is illustrated by the fact that official records for the land transferred  in 1996  indicate that in all cases where no credit from Caja
Agraria was needed (because the seller advanced the 30% complementary  credit to the buyer), a farm plan or productive project was "not
required".
16potential beneficiaries have understood the model budgets, including their requirements and economic
implications, do they proceed to a pre-selection  of farms they might like to visit.
Thus, instead of being regarded as a tedious necessity to obtaining access to complementary credit (as
under the old program), farm plans under the pilot program acquired significant importance  in a number
of aspects. First, from a substantive  point of view the farm models that have been established thus far do
constitute a break with the past in that the main goal is to provide full employment of the family's labor
force throughout the year. Second, farm plans are characterized by a focus on high value crops rather
than traditional bulk commodities, greater diversification  of crop production, and an important livestock
component. Third, all  plans include a  significant "garden plot", setting aside about one hectare for
domestic consumption needs (including chickens, one pig,  and a  cow) and  intensive cultivation of
vegetables or fruits, the surplus of which is to be sold in the market. In the process of shifting emphasis
towards these goals, the importance  of land area has declined significantly  - in many cases the land area
is between 30% and 50% of what had been the standard under earlier land reform programs. In addition
to this, farm plans also serve as a first step towards the identification and prioritization of investment
needs, and to provide a justification for guiding the allocation of public funds to the most productive use.
3.2.3  Beneficiary  training and project approval
Negotiated land reform requires beneficiaries to take considerable initiative and perform tasks such as
group formation, selection of a viable farm model, adaptation of this general model to the conditions of a
specific farm, identification of the productive value of at  least a number of farms available for sale,
negotiation of a purchase price with the farm owner, arrangement for a credit to finance the land and
capital requirements that are not covered by the purchase grant, formulation of a strategy to establish
needed on-farm infrastructure, and  eventually cope with the  challenges and  risks  associated with
sustaining an economically viable farm enterprise. Given their limited endowments and  experience,
potential beneficiaries are generally unable to go through the steps required in a "negotiated" type of land
reform without assistance. In fact, while most of the beneficiaries  pre-selected in the pilot had some kind
of agricultural experience, almost one quarter was illiterate and  70% had 5 years or less of formal
education. While many were in a great rush to receive land, their ability to negotiate or manage resources
was clearly limited. Furthermore, even though many beneficiaries came in pre-existing groups, these
groups were often based on coincidence  more than on similarity of interest. The capacity of these groups
to resolve internal conflicts or to devise effective strategies to achieve common goals was low or non-
17existent. Problems that will inevitably arise in  jointly establishing  and sustaining  an agricultural enterprise
would probably have led to the paralysis or breakup of many of these groups. 28
To remedy this, and thus increase the scope for land reform to lead to productivity-enhancing  outcomes,
an  in-depth training program for pre-selected aspirantes was developed. 29 This program, which  is
financed from INCORA's administrative  budget, aims to cover not only abstract principles but to enable
beneficiaries to formulate a viable farm plan. The "theory" part includes topics that range from group
dynamics and negotiation to economic analysis, farm management,  and budgeting.  Simultaneously,  or as
soon as beneficiaries have tentatiyely formed groups and decided for certain crop combinations, this is
translated into practice in the context of visits to farms that have been offered for sale, calculation of the
potential of these farms to generate revenue, the implications for the price that can be paid, the needed
startup investments to allow productive use of the farm, and the way in which these can be effected in
practice by the beneficiary  group.
Contrary to widespread fears, lack of local capacity has not been a problem in developing these training
programs. Local  Universities, NGOs, farmers'  organizations, and govemment institutions (including
INCORA) are enthusiastic to utilize synergies in providing such support in the expectation that they will
follow the projects at least through the establishment  phase. While the costs of this component are not
negligible (about US $ 1,800 per beneficiary), this is not only less than one third of what was spent by
INCORA under the old process but can be more than justified in terms of the outcomes achieved in
negotiations. Prices paid for comparable farms under the pilot were about 40% lower than what had been
paid in the previous year under INCORA's program. 30 Furthermore, while under the INCORA process
some beneficiaries cancelled technical assistance contracts that had existed under the previous owner,
pilot beneficiaries are keenly aware of the importance  of continuing technical support and provisions to
pay for this service out of farm revenues are made in all of the respective  farm budgets.
A review of unsuccessful land reform cases had indicated two main reasons for failure. One was the
absence of a fully funded plan to undertake the investments needed to convert the large farm into an
enterprise suitable for small farmer cultivation, and the lack of funds to carry beneficiaries through to the
first harvest. To deal with this, the training phase is utilized to develop, together with beneficiaries, a
2  Indeed one of the surprising insights from the pilot was that virtually all of the groups that had initially existed  were disbanded and replaced by
new ones that were based more on commonality  of interest (e.g. in specific  production systems)  or complementarity  in experience .
29 The number of pre-selected  aspirantes is about double the number of those that could be accommodated as beneficiaries with given budgets to
allow for attrition and to ensure  that potential beneficiaries do indeed compete in trying to put together the most viable farm projects.
3  These price differences are not due to quality factors. In one case, a farm neighboring (and almost identical) to one that had been acquired in
1996 by INCORA (supposedly under the market-assisted  program) was acquired under the pilot with a price saving of about 40% -money
which beneficiaries used to pay for complementary  investments and working capital. In other cases, discounts of similar magnitude were
obtained on the "official valuations" that had been commissioned  by the landowners.
18detailed plan (monitored by indicators) for the on-farm investments needed to convert the farm into a
smallholder enterprise. The ability to obtain partial funding for the startup activities undertaken during
this phase has proven to be critical for the project's success.
The  second problem was related to  lack of  access to  credit  and output markets. Under the pilot,
agreements have been reached with a number of cooperative banks already active in rural areas to lend to
land reform beneficiaries and thus compete with the  government-owned  bank that  has traditionally
provided financing to land reform beneficiaries. The preferred arrangement bears similarity to contract
farming whereby the bank works closely with the providers of technical  assistance (ensuring  that the farm
business established by beneficiaries would indeed generate the desired revenues) and  help farmers
market produce. This enables them to  supervise the  use of the  credit more closely, to  ensure that
enterprises are indeed developing their productive potential, and to deduct loan repayments at the source,
rather than relying on unrealistic expectations  of foreclosure. Problems of inter-institutional coordination
(essentially the inability of the institutions who have traditionally administered  these funds to work with
non-governmental institutions) have prevented extending this  model to  all  of the pilot  municipios.
However, beneficiaries from all the pilot municipios are unequivocal  in their preference for dealing with
a predictable private sector institution rather than with an unpredictable bureaucracy that is directly or
indirectly dependent on government. 3'
In line with the principle that responsibility has to rest at the local level, all of the pilot municipios decide
about the approval (and funding) of specific productive projects in public sessions of the municipal
council - generally with record attendance. In these sessions beneficiaries have to present and defend
their project, thus not only indicating that they understood the critical issues, but also providing an
example to  guide  other candidates for  the  land purchase grant  and  thus  setting  the  stage  for  a
transformation of the image of land reform in more general terms. In addition to generating positive
feedback loops - beneficiaries who were selected in last year's  INCORA land reform projects have
already demanded access to similar technical assistance- this also establishes the basis for community-
based monitoring and social control to ensure that beneficiaries' performance does actually live up to
expectations.
3'  Indeed, obtaining financing for the projects elaborated by beneficiaries  in the pilot municipios developed into one of the main obstacles for
smooth implementation. Even though all projects had been thoroughly evaluated and approved at the local level (including visits by bank
representatives),  it took the govemment ownedCaja Agraria between four and five months to obtain central approval from Bogota. This
severely damaged  the goodwill of landlords who wanted to sell and jeopardizedbeneficiaris' ability to proceed with their plans in a
timely fashion and was often combined with dictating of changes to the projects which were incompatible  with beneficiaries' preferences
or needs.. In view of this, all the parties (including beneficiaries) involved in the pilot agree that the pilot experience call be successfully
transformed into a broader national program only if the monopoly ofCaja Agraria is broken and private sector institutions finalice land
reform projects. This would, of course, imply  that they assume some of the associated  risks.
193.2.4  Monitoring and evaluation
It is well known that decentralization  without adequate  mechanisms  of accountability  may not have the
desired consequences. In addition to  helping focus on project quality rather than merely physical
quantities  (e.g. land  transferred)  as an outcome  indicator,  a system  that monitors  successive  stages of land
reform implementation would help to  quickly identify and rectify unforeseen deviations from the
program's overall objectives, in addition to  assessing its  long-term impacts. Use of  a  grant-based
mechanism  that relies on market transactions  to redistribute  productive  assets is an innovative  approach
and the  strong reliance on  decentralized mechanisms of  implementation generates a  tremendous
opportunity to  learn from innovative practices that  are developed in  some communities. Careful
monitoring  is therefore essential  to assess the degree  to which the program  attains its overall goals and to
identify means for improving on implementation.  This is critical to provide greater responsiveness  to
operational  difficulties  than has been available  in INCORA  practices.  Table 2 relates key components  of
monitoring  and impact  evaluation  to the issues discussed  in the municipal  land  reform  plan.
To provide answers  to these questions, it is necessary  to consider which instruments  are best suited to
reach particular target groups, maximize the net benefits of land reform (or minimize the cost of its
execution),  and are compatible with a rapid attainment  of the government's quantitative  goals and how
they perform in terms of beneficiaries'  adherence  to the project plans they have established  (and the
associated economic benefits). Of course, the most important  question is what the direct and indirect
impacts of such an approach  on agricultural  productivity  and poverty  reduction  are and how it compares
with other instruments  at the government's disposal,  such as construction  of infrastructure  or support  to
education.  This would  facilitate a judgement  regarding  when, and under what conditions,  land reform can
constitute  a sustainable  and worthwhile  use of public  funds.
20Table 2: Key variables for land reform planning, monitoring, and impact assessment
Municipal  land reform plan  Monitoring  Impact assessment
Beneficiaries  Beneficiary  identification  Grant  per  beneficiary/employment. Increase  in income
Beneficiary  profile  (capacity;  Group  formation.  Consumption  smoothing  (assets).
welfare)  Additional  employment  generated.  Credit  market  access
Training  requirements  Targeting  efficiency.  Social  services.
Specific projects  Improvements in access to land.  Reduction of violence
Projects  Demand  and supply  of land  Characteristics  of farns transfefred.  Agricultural  productivity
Char's  of productive  projects  Implementation  of projects.  Environmental  sustainability
Complementary  investments  needed  Repayment  performnance  (planned and  Reconcentration  of land?
Cost by component  actual).
Targeting of under utilized lands
Institutions  Institutional  capacity:  Effectiveness in  dissemination and  Strengthened  local govemment.
Local and central  government  (tech.  capacity  building  Fiscal  sustainability
assist.  legal framework)  Efficiency  of land transfer  process.  Degree  of decentralization
Private  Sector  (banks,  input  Private  sector/NGO  participation.
suppliers,  marketing)
NGOs  (training,  evaluation))
Monitoring aims to ascertain whether the program actually achieves its objectives and whether it is doing
so  at  low  cost.  To this  end,  it describes  what is  happening  on  the  ground,  compares  it to  original
objectives, and uses the information to update original parameters. The information provided can also be
used to (i) assess whether the mechanisms utilized do reach target populations and areas (i.e. poor rural
dwellers and underutilized lands); (ii) provide an ex-ante estimate of the expected benefits of land reform,
both  in  terms  of  productivity  and  poverty  reduction;  and  (iii)  provide  information  on  whether
implementation  is progressing as expected. Impact  assessment, in turn,  is concerned with the ultimate
impact,  both  direct  and  indirect,  of the  program  on  household well-being,  agricultural  productivity,
environmental  sustainability,  and  institutional  strengthening.  To this  end  a  nation-wide  LSMS-type
household  survey, and  a farm survey, will be used as a control group, to be  compared to  a panel  of
beneficiaries and lands that will be established under the program.
4  COMPARISON  WITH OTHER  COUNTRIES
In addition  to  Colombia, Brazil  and  South Africa  have, under  different  conditions,  recently  initiated
programs of negotiated  land reform. With an institutional background very similar to that of Colombia
(presence of land  reform  legislation  and  a central  land reform  institute dating  from the early  1960s),
negotiated  land reform  in Brazil  has  been  driven by  individual  states'  initiative.  The purpose  of the
Brazilian interventions is to establish cheaper, more agile policy alternatives to centralized land reform in
an  environment  where  the  issue  of  land  reform  is  high  up  on  the  political  agenda  and  potential
beneficiaries have at least some idea of what to do with the land.
21By  contrast,  negotiated  land  reform  in  South Africa has  been  adopted  in the context of the  national
reconstruction  program,  in an environment in which productive  small-scale agriculture  was eradicated
almost a century  ago. This  implies that, in its present form, the program bears many similarities to an
urban  settlement  project  and  greater  effort  is  required  to  establish  the  decentralized  infrastructure
necessary to implement land reform, to provide complementary services such as marketing and technical
assistance, and to increase beneficiaries' agricultural and entrepreneurial capacity.
4.1  BRAZIL
With a land distribution among the most unequal in the world, Brazil's  situation is similar to Colombia's
in a number of respects. There is a very large and vocal political demand for land reform; a recent FAO
study estimates the number of families who are potential candidates for land reform at 2.5 million. A land
reform  institute (INCRA) was established  in 1969, distributing  10 million hectares to 200,000 families
and colonizing about  14 million hectares for about 75,000 beneficiary families since then. Land reform
has  recently  acquired  considerable  political importance;  a  federal Minister  for  Agrarian Reform  was
appointed in 1996 and the land reform budget tripled from US$0.4 billion in 1994 to $1.3 billion in 1995
with a further increase to $2.6 billion proposed in 1997.
The large majority of these federal funds will be spent according to the oldprocess which has been costly
(about $30,000 per  beneficiary) and bureaucratically  cumbersome.  However, state governments  in the
Northeast  have  been  moving ahead and  set up  a decentralized  market  assisted pilot scheme. 32  This
scheme (supported  by  a 90 million $ external loan) aims to speed up the land reform  process, reduce
costs, and provide the basis for a model that could eventually be adopted nation-wide. 33
The main differences from the old mechanism are the following (compare table 1):
(i)  Rather than relying on a lengthy process of expropriation, land is selected by community-groups on a
willing  seller-willing  buyer  basis.  This  is  expected  to  reduce  the  price  of  land  from  currently
32 The steps involved in the process of expropriation, which is applicable to land that is utilized to  less than 80%, are as follows: First there is a
visit by  an INCRA mission to  assess the value  of land  and improvements,  followed by expropriation  through  presidential  decree  and
confirmation of expropriation through a federal court (emissao de posse) in a process that takes about a year. Once this is accomplished,
landowners  are compensated  with Titulos da Reforma Agraria  (with a real interest  rate of 6%; bearing  a discount  of 25-40%  in the
market);  anecdotal  evidence  of  excessive  compensation  abounds.  The  necessary  infrastructure  investment  is  then  included  in  the
subsequent  year's  INCRA  budget  (it takes  1-2 years for  the  infrastructure to  be established)  and INCRA  announces  that  the land  is
available, selecting beneficiaries based on agricultural skills, although in practice all cases are limited to regularization of existing squatter
settlements.  Once selected, beneficiaries are eligible for credit from PROCERA (max US$7,500; average US$4,500), a special program
for land reform beneficiaries administered through INCRA (with an effective subsidy of about 70%).
3  The emphasis on land reform by the federal Government and the initiation of altemative approaches by state Governors (essentially in the hope
of being able to demonstrate that they are able to deal with the problem more effectively) is certainly not unrelated to the political strength
22US$11,000  to $3,000,  mainly by avoiding  the need to pay for expensive  land improvements  that are
of little use for small scale agriculture.  Funds for the land purchase  are extended  to beneficiaries  as a
pro forma credit that has to be repaid upon emancipacion, an official declaration  that the farmer is
now able to farm independently,  that is combined  with the transfer  of the title. 34
(ii) Instead  of compensating  landlords  with highly  discounted  government  bonds,  they are paid cash. This
provides a strong incentive  for landowners-including many banks who hold title to large tracts of
land as a collateral  for non-performing  loans-to  sell land  to land reform  beneficiaries.
(iii)  Government's  role is reduced  to providing  assurance  that there are no problems  with the land titles,
and ensuring that the price negotiated  between community  groups  and landlords  is within acceptable
boundaries.  Projects  are approved  at the state level.
(iv) Technical assistance is provided  on a strictly demand driven basis; beneficiaries  can use part of the
community  grant made available under a World Bank loan to contract private providers;  CONTAG
(Federation of Rural Workers) participates in the  state councils and  assists with information
dissemination  and land purchase  negotiations.
(v) The only commonality between pilots and the nation-wide land reform process is the fact that
beneficiaries under the new process have access to a subsidized loan under a  special program
(PROCERA)  for land  reform  beneficiaries.
While the broad principles  are similar  to those in Colombia,  the process  is considerably  more flexible  and
agile. The main points of difference  are  the following:
(i)  Since grant financing is provided  for complementary  and community-level  infrastructure  rather than
land itself, beneficiaries  who expect to repay  their land purchase loan have an incentive  to bid down
the price for land as much as possible. This creates an incentive  to focus on lands that are currently
underutilized,  thus reducing  the expected  purchase  price and directing  land reform  to areas where the
social gains from the intervention  are maximized.
(ii) The process of beneficiary  selection  is less formal and bureaucratic  than in Colombia,  relying on an
infrastructure  of existing community  associations  to conduct information campaigns. Community
control facilitates greater flexibility in project execution but also creates a danger that, without
mechanisms for  supervision and ex-post  accountability, landowners select former workers as
of the landless movement  (Movimiento sem Terra, MS7).  Whether the  MST will modify its approach  in favor of the old type of land
reform projects will, among others, also depend on the degree to which the new approach will be able to live up to expectations.
'4 The number of land reform properties that have been emancipated is minuscule.
23beneficiaries and a minority of politically  vocal and well represented  monopolizes  a large part of
program  benefits.
(iii)As long as beneficiary organizations  exist that can assist farmers in preparing projects and in the
initial stages of establishment,  the solution  chosen-where technical  assistance  can be financed,  on a
voluntary basis, through the community grant-is  appropriate.  However, evaluation of the initial
projects should examine  whether  this prevents  beneficiaries  from shifting  to higher value crops and a
shift in production  patterns.
(iv) Given the high subsidy  element (about 70%) in the working capital credit provided  to beneficiaries,
availability  of government  funds for this credit may easily become a binding  constraint for program
implementation.  In addition, the longer-tern economic  viability of land reform beneficiaries will
depend critically on their ability to  gain access to alternative sources of working capital and
marketing channels.  This, together with the question  to what degree beneficiaries  do actually expect
to repay even working capital credits, could become one of the critical issues for the long term
success  of land reform.
Given the political importance  of land reform and the limited knowledge  of both the most appropriate
mechanisms  to implement  this reform as well as the magnitude  of the productivity  and poverty-impact,
the government has established the Central Institute for Agrarian Studies to (i) encourage discussion
between all parts of civil society, academics, and politicians on land reform issues; (ii) carry out a
thorough  and careful monitoring  and evaluation  of the land reform  process  either directly  or through local
institutions;  (iii) make  the data collected  in this process  available  to national  and international  researchers,
thus acting as a hub in a broader network of countries and researchers interested in negotiated land
reform.
4.2  SoUTH  AFRICA
While  South Africa shares with  Brazil  and Colombia  a highly unequal  land distribution, policies  that
neglected the land rights of the non-white population have systematically exacerbated these inequalities.
The Native Lands Act of 1912 prohibited the establishment of new farming operations, sharecropping, or
cash rentals by blacks outside of the reserves, which made up only 7.7% of the country's  area. Inside the
reserves  an artificial form  of "traditional" tenure with maximum  holding sizes and restrictions  on  land
transactions  was imposed.  Subsequent policies of "black spot removal" transferred the large majority of
black  farmers who  had  legitimately owned land outside the reserves  into the homelands where  tenure
24restrictions,  high population density, and lack of capital and market access made commercial agriculture
virtually impossible. Labor laws that discriminated against blacks in favor of white workers and generous
capital subsidies  contributed to successive evictions of large parts  of the black  population from white
farms,  where they had  been employed as labor tenants and  farm workers (Binswanger and Deininger,
1993).
While the Native Lands Act was repealed in 1993, the momentous task  of a comprehensive reversal of
these policies and their consequences was left to the government that entered power following the  1994
elections. In attempting to do so, this  government had to contend not only with the extremely  unequal
land distribution  (the average amount held  per person was  1.3 hectares  by  blacks compared to  1,570
hectares  by  whites)  but  also  the  lack  of  any  local  government  structure,  widespread  absence  of
administrative  capacity, a  highly indebted large  farm sector,  and fear that redistribution would  wreak
havoc with agricultural productivity  and jeopardize  national food security. The government decided to
adopt a land reform policy that would redress the injustices of apartheid, foster national reconciliation and
stability, underpin economic growth, improve household welfare, and alleviate poverty (Govermnent of
South Africa, 1996). The three central components of this policy are as follows:
(i)  Restitution: Legal processes have been put in place to compensate (in cash or kind) individuals who
had been victims of forced removals after 1913. All Restitution cases are dealt with through the Land
Claims Court and Commission, established  in  1994 to which claims had to be  submitted within a
specified  time  period (end of  1997). Hopes to  be able to  complete the  legal process  in a  speedy
manner have been disappointed - as of the end of 1998 less than  10 (out of about 10,000) cases have
been resolved.  As  expected, the inability  of the vast majority of the population to furnish written
evidence has made this option feasible for only a small part of the population.
(ii) Land  tenure reform:  This  component  seeks  to  improve tenure  security  of  all  South  Africans  by
recognizing individual as well as communal ownership rights to land, giving people the right to make
decisions  about  their  own  tenure  system,  adjudicating  disputes,  reforming  tenancy  laws,  and
attempting to end discrimination against women in land allocation and holding. It is intended to create
the administrative  infrastructure that will provide hitherto disadvantaged groups with access to land
under a wide array of arrangements that are in line with agro-ecological endowments and community
characteristics. It is hoped that this will provide the regulatory environment for a land rental market
by transferring land to more productive users, redressing the inefficiencies of the apartheid system.
25(iii)Redistribution:  As the main component of the government's  land reform policy, redistribution aims
to  complement  the  market  by  providing  land  for  productive  and  residential  purposes to  a  large
number of rural blacks who were dispossessed during apartheid and who are interested in obtaining
land.  It  aims  to  do  so  by  providing  a  one-time  Settlement/Land  Acquisition  Grant  of R15,000
(US$3,300), the amount  of which  is equivalent to the National Housing Subsidy available in urban
areas to eligible beneficiaries, defined as anyone with a monthly salary below R 1,500. The choice of
negotiated  land reform  rather  than  expropriation (which, as in  Colombia, can still  be used as an
instrument of last resort) was based on the need to maintain public confidence in the land market, and
more generally to affirm the government's  respect for individual property rights. It also reflects the
recognition that in other countries expropriation has failed to provide rapid access to land for a large
number of people and instead degenerated into lengthy political maneuvering andrent-seeking.  The
number of potential land reform beneficiaries is considerable; estimates indicate that there are about
200,000 labor tenants and  1 million farm workers, and as many as 7-8 million blacks in the reserves
(not all of which would, of course, be interested in land reform).
The fact that the large majority of the rural population has never seen a successful and productive small
farm, and that many of the land reform beneficiaries themselves seem to believe that efficient agricultural
production  is possible  only  on  large farms,  gives capacity building  particular  importance. The  South
African government is well aware of these issues and has set up a number of pilots in different provinces
to accumulate experience and  improve the execution of land reform. These projects are now gathering
momentum  and  have  provided  a  number  of  valuable  lessons,  many  of  which  are  currently  being
integrated into government policies:
(i)  The almost complete fungibility of the land purchase grant represents  an important advantage over
the  Brazilian  and  Colombian  models.  It  prevents  individuals  without  comparative  advantage  in
farming from becoming land reform beneficiaries just to secure the government subsidy, while at the
same time eliminating the possibility that land reform will inflate land prices. However, the absence
of any  effective  beneficiary contribution  has resulted  in the formation of unwieldy  organizational
structures  (the  average "Community  Trust"  established  under  the  program  comprises  about  200
households)  which  are  geared  more towards  acquisition  of  land  than  successful  operation  of  an
agricultural enterprise.
(ii) While it is the government's  goal to execute land reform with maximum local participation, the lack
of  an  institutional  structure  has  up  to  now  made  effective  decentralization  and  beneficiary
participation  difficult. This has resulted in huge demands being placed on DLA staff and at the same
26time considerably  slowed down  the process  (the projected  time for DLA to process a project is about
14 months, and often more time is required).  While progress  has been made in addressing  this issue,
real involvement  of local players is likely  to require  some devolution  of decision-making  authority  (at
present each land designation  has to be signed by the Minister himself)  and a shift towards  ex post
control.  This, of course, is contingent  on appropriate  information  systems  being  in place.
(iii)Beneficiaries'  access to complementary  services  and infrastructure  has been  problematic  - a situation
that was exacerbated because responsibility for these services rests outside DLA, the  agency
responsible for land reform execution. 35 These shortcomings  can be addressed by empowering
emerging  local governments  to play a stronger  role in coordinating  the different institutions  involved
at the local level. In addition,  more systematically  incorporating  the private sector (banks and other
financial  institutions,  as well as current land  owners)  in the formulation  and evaluation  of farm plans,
the provision  of technical  assistance,  as well as marketing  and input supply,  could effectively  address
the current problems  of "aftercare".
(iv) While there is strong emphasis  on elaboration  of land use and business  plans by beneficiaries,  many
of these plans have been elaborated  by entities who do not have responsibility for the long-term
economic success of the project and do not contain arrangements  for technical assistance in the
project's establishment  phase. The experience  from land reform in Latin America illustrates  that, in
the  absence of clear plan that  is available before accessing the land, there is  a  danger that
beneficiaries  will eat up whatever  capital stock was transferred  with the farm and subsequently  revert
to survival farming. This neglect of the productivity  aspect of land reforn,  often exacerbated by
unwieldy group sizes and lack of coordination  among  different institutions,  could seriously threaten
the poverty-reducing  potential of this intervention,  in addition to having negative environmental
consequences  (Cross et al., 1996).36
3  Based on a case study of one of the provincial land reform pilot in Kwazulu Natal, Cross et al. (1996) report four main shortcomings, namely
(i) a complete  lack of  interinstitutional  coordination (e.g.  concerning access to water  resources); (ii) underestimation  of the  time and
energy required for legal issues such as adjudication between conflicting land claims; (iii) political tensions between ANC and IFP (at the
national and provincial  level, respectively) which prevent the effective delivery of services other than land to the beneficiaries, and (iv) a
tendency  to  interfere by  local chiefs who perceive land reform mainly  as a means to  enhance  their own power which depends  on the
number of people they are able to accommodate rather than the productive success of the programs that are established.
36 "NGOs and pilot structures are.... beginning to be afraid that they would not be able to do more than provide land redistribution beneficiaries
with the minimum of land and secure tenure and that this alone would amount to just dumping them -equivalent  to the apartheid practice
of dumping removals victims in the middle of the veld with no shelter and no way to make a living" (Cross et al. 1996 p. 166).
275  CONCLUSION
To demonstrate  that negotiated  land  reform can provide  a solution  to the problem  of asset maldistribution
observed  in many  developing  countries,  two key questions  need  to be answered.  First, one needs to show
that the new approach  is more effective  and less costly than earlier land reform attempts.  Second, it will
be necessary  to establish  that investment  of scarce  government  resources in land reform  is warranted.
While a final judgement on whether or not negotiated land reform can rise to the challenges that
administrative  land reform has failed to solve will have to await availability of appropriate  data, 37 the
experience from the three countries provides valuable lessons that can guide attempts to  implement
programs of land reform. It  suggests that (i) land reform through negotiation can only succeed if
measures are taken to make the market for land sales and rental more transparent and fluid; (ii)
productive projects are a  core element of market-assisted  land reform that is designed to establish
economically  viable and productive  projects  at a socially-justifiable  cost rather than to transfer assets;  (iii)
the only way to achieve  effective coordination  of the various entities  involved in this process is through
demand-driven  and decentralized  implementation;  and (iv) the long run success  of land  reform  is likely to
depend critically on getting the private sector involved in implementation,  and the ability to utilize the
land purchase  grant to "crowd in" private  money.
Making land markets more transparent and fluid:  While there  is broad agreement that selection of land
and beneficiaries should be demand-driven  and effected at the local level, the problem is that the
conditions  for local land markets  to function,  such as information  on land prices as well as beneficiaries'
ability to assess the value of a piece of land or the potential productive returns of its more intensive
cultivation,  are often limited.  Three mutually  reinforcing  strategies  to deal with this constraint  are (i) the
provision of technical assistance  at the community  level, including assessment of the adequacy of the
land price at the point of transaction, (ii) co-financing  of the land purchase through a private financial
intermediary  which, because it shares in the risk of default,  will have an incentive  to assess the economic
feasibility  of the proposed  farming  project;  (iii) a "market information  system" to provide  prices for plots
transacted  in the market  - both with and without  use of a land purchase  grant.
Negotiated  land  reformn  is a complement,  rather  than a substitute  for other forms of gaining  access  to land,
especially land rental. In this sense, land rental should be understood is a means for beneficiaries to
accumulate experience  and start-up capital thus reducing the size of the land purchase grant required
under a model of negotiated  land reform.  This has to replace an understanding  whereby  renting out might
37 Data  for such an exercise  will hopefully  be supplied  by the monitoring  systems  that are established  in all of the countries  described.
28cause owners to lose their land or renting in may cause tenants to become ineligible for a land purchase
grant. Up to now none of the models considered here have contemplated in depth the potential benefits of
inter-regional  migration,  and  ways to  encourage  such migration  to  reduce the  cost  of a  land  reforrn
program and at the same time enhance its impact on productivity.
Focusing  on productive  projects:  Productive projects are  likely to be the key of market  assisted land
reforn  (i)  because  it  is the  only  objective criterion to  put an upper  bound  on the  price  that  can  be
expected to be paid; (ii) because it provides a necessary basis for financial intermediaries to evaluate and
eventually support such projects; and (iii) because it requires beneficiaries to familiarize themselves with
the realities  they  are likely to  confront as independent farmers, and in the process  provides them  with
greater clarity on their own aspirations as well as the potential-and  the limitations-of  land reform to
contribute to the attainment of these goals. In contrast to previous plans that were imposed from the top
with little awareness of local constraints, these plans aim to create the basis for a more transparent market
at  the  local  level  and  are  the  starting  point  rather  than  a  substitute  for  more  active  beneficiary
involvement.
Decentralizing  implementation. Experience with centralized land reforn  has revealed it as a slow -and
costly- alternative to decentralized negotiation. In Colombia, the whole pilot, from the first dissemination
efforts to project  approval by  a technical  committee and  local financial intermnediaries,  was completed
within 7 months 38 - with landlords being the most eager party to see it advance. Prices paid under the
decentralized  approach  were  about  40%  below  the  cost  of  land  that  had  been  paid  earlier  and
beneficiaries see a major benefit from training and detailed project planning in their ability to negotiate
independently  with landowners  and the fact that  they have  a clear  idea of how to  proceed  once they
receive  the  land.  Similar  figures  are  available  from  Brazil  where  the  presence  of  community-
organizations  allowed even more speedy implementation. Even  in South Africa,  where the absence  of
local  institutions  at  the  start  of the  program  made  a  relatively  centralized  mode  of implementation
necessary,  the  rapid  emergence  of local  governments has  already  facilitated  significant  steps  toward
greater decentralization and advances in program implementation.
Maximizing private  sector  involvement: Two lessons have become evident about the financing of land
reforrn. First, restricting a land reform grant to a specific part of the land reform package to the exclusion
of others (as was originally the case in Colombia) is likely to be counterproductive; a flat grant that can
Following approval of productive  projects  at the  local level, centralized  institutions (INCORA and Caja Agraria) engaged  in endless soul-
searching  and  tried  to  reject  projects  because  they  were  "too  far  from infrastructure"  (even  though  construction  of  a bridges  or
rehabilitation  of roads  were part of the farm development  plan) or otherwise  not suited for smallholder  cultivation.  Even though  in the end
all of the projects  were approved,  this did much to undermine  the credibility  of the process  with sellers.
29be used for all types of expenditures  (as in South Africa)  is clearly  preferable.  Second,  without effective
beneficiary  contribution  and assured access  to financial  markets as a part of the land reform package it
will be difficult for beneficiaries  to develop financially  sustainable operations.  There seems scope for
exploring  possibilities  of combining  this with mechanisms  aimed at sustainable  savings  generation.  Given
the high transaction  costs of providing  credit in rural areas and the increased  need for monitoring  when
most clients lack previous exposure  to credit, it is important  that this issue be given sufficient attention.
This relies heavily  on the formulation  of economically  viable and technically  feasible  productive  projects.
Getting participants-government  bureaucrats and NGOs  as  well  as  potential beneficiaries-to
realistically  assess the potential  as well as the dangers  inherent  in negotiated  land reform  is critical.
Such a focus on "integrated land market development"  that aims to develop land markets  jointly with
markets for other factors  may offer potential  not only in situations  such as the ones described  here where
land is distributed  very inequitably.  It may also help countries  (e.g. Nicaragua,  Honduras,  El Salvador)
where large land  reforms has not had the desired  productivity  impact  to realize  the productive  potential  of
the reform sector and provide a model for "fair" dispute resolution in situations  (e.g. Uganda) where
overlapping claims  and  long-standing disputes over  land ownership have severely affected the
productivity  of land use. If negotiated  land reform achieves  to direct efforts towards policies that make
markets work better for the poor, and at the same time helps beneficiaries  improve  their human capital
endowments,  change from passive objects into subjects  of the process, and convert a one-time subsidy
into a permanent  improvement  of their livelihood,  it will have more  than achieved  its purpose.
30Table 1:  Comparison  of mechanisms  to implement  market  assisted  land reform  in Colombia,  Brazil,  and South  Africa.
Colombia  Brazil  South  Africa
INCORA  Market  Assisted  INCRA  Market  Assisted  Pilots
Land selection  Selection  by INCORA  de factor  By beneficiaries;  with  means  to  Purchase  or expropriation;  Negotiated  by community;  willing  Community  initiative.
based on political  pressure;  Cost  increase  transparency  and  provide  average  cost of $ 11,600  per  seller  (including  banks)-  willing
of $ 18,000  - 22,000  per family.  technical  assistance.  family;  mainly  legalization  of  buyer;  expected  cost $ 3,000  per
occupied lands.  beneficiary.
Land financing  70% of land  value (up to $  Commercial  bank  administers  TDAs  for unimproved  land and  Loan to approved  beneficiaries  Max.  grant of R 15,000  for land purchase;
22,000)  as grant  (20% cash; 50%  grant  resources  and  provides  cash for improvements  and  from a commercial  bank  separate  planning  grant.
bonds);  30% through  Caja  additional  credit for land  crops;  beneficiaries  in theory  (considerable  subsidy  element).
Agraria  credit  (lengthy  delays).  purchase  and  working  capital.  expected  to pay  back; not
enforced.
Beneficiary  Point  scheme  for social  need and  Comprehensive  registration;  and  Through  INCRA  based  on  Self-selection  of beneficiaries;  Self-selection  of beneficiaries  subject  to
selection  agricultural  experience;  in  pre-selection  based  on social  examination  of agriculture  clearance  of price  and title by State  maximum  income  criterion  (< R 1,500  per
practice  ad-hoc  selection  based  criteria.  Final  selection  based on  knowledge;  in practice  almost  Land Institute;  decentralized  month).
on individual  farms.  productive  projects.  all are  regularized  squatters.  approval.  Occupied  lands
ineligible.
Farming  project  Perceived  to be necessary  only  to  Key issue  for selection;  different  No specific  arrangements.  Up  to 8% of project  value  Provincial  plan is a precondition  but few
definition  obtaining  a Bank  loan.  forms  of technical  assistance  available  for technical assistance  specific  guidelines  provided  and  no farm
available.  in project  preparation  and  models  are elaborated.
Farm  models  available  at  implementation.  Farm models
municipal level.  elaborated  at state level.
Other  financing  Credit  for land and working  Independent  financial  institutions  Credit of up to $ 1150  (average  Access  to PROCERA  credit like  Responsibility  of beneficiaries.
capital  is the big bottleneck  to provide  integrated  credit  for  $ 610) for food and  housing and  other  land reform beneficiaries.
causing  implementation  delays.  the whole  project.  $ 7,500  (average  $ 4,500)  for
working  capital.  70%  subsidy
element;  minimal  cost
recovery.
Off-farm  Complex  set of interinstitutional  Identified  and  priced in municipal  Provided  by INCRA  ($ 3,200 in  Grant of $ 4,000  per beneficiary;  Services  and to some  extent infrastructure
investments  coordination  with little results  up  land reform  plan.  1994,  now up to $ 8000);  disbursed  directly  to community.  are provincial  responsibility;  coordination
to now.  almost  all for roads.  with  the center  is still weak.References
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